Abstract-in a proxy multi-signature, the proxy signer can sign a message on behalf of more than one original signer. However, in some cases, the proxy or the original signers do not want to leak the proxy signer's identity. In addition, when something is wrong with the signed message, the identity of the proxy signer has to be revealed. So the problem of anonymous but accountable has been proposed. Using the technology of pseudonym and secret sharing, in this paper, a simple method was proposed to reach the target of anonymous but accountable. In the scheme, the identity of the proxy signer was anonymous, but when t or more original signers want to reveal the proxy signer's identity, the proxy signer's identity would be revealed and be demonstrated.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an important part of cryptography, digital signature draws lots of attention [1] [2] [3] . In 2000, Yi et al. proposed two proxy multi-signature schemes [4] . In a proxy multi-signature, the proxy signer can sign a message on behalf of more than one original signer. Based on Yi et al.'s scheme, in 2001, Lee et al. propose a new proxy multi-signature scheme with strong property [5] . Then, lots of proxy multi-signatures were proposed [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] .
In order to verify the proxy multi-signature, the verifier needs get the proxy and all the original signers' public keys. Obviously, the verification procedure would expose the identity of the proxy signer. In 2006, Han et al proposed a scheme to solve the anonymous but accountable problem of a proxy signer [12] . But in the scheme, they use a trust third party to reveal the real proxy signer. In 2012, Du et al. proposed a method to reach the target of anonymous but accountable property [13] . But, when it comes to the proxy multi-signature scheme, the method was not appropriately.
In this paper, using the technology of pseudonym and secret sharing, a simple method was proposed to reach the target of anonymous but accountable in a proxy multi-signature scheme. In the scheme, the identity of the proxy signer was anonymous, but when t or more original signers want to reveal the proxy signer's identity, the proxy signer's identity would be revealed and be demonstrated. Compared with the protocol of Du et al., in our scheme, the original signers need not to renew their secret keys after revealing the identity of the proxy signer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some preliminaries employed later in this paper. Section 3 proposes the scheme of the special proxy multisignature. We analysis the security of the proposed scheme in section 4 and finally conclude in Section 5.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Because bilinear maps and the secret sharing play the key roles in our scheme, we would describe basic properties of them, and then also list some related mathematical hard problems.
A. Bilinear Pairings
Let 1 G be a cyclic additive group and 2 G be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same large prime order q . We also assume that the discrete logarithm problems ( ) DLP in both 1 G and 2 G are hard to solve. A map 1 1 2 : e G G G × → is an admissible bilinear map [14] [15] if it satisfies the three following properties:
1. 
≤ ≤ is the shareholder's ID. At last, the algorithm outputs a list of n shares 1 2 ( , , , ) n s s s K . Each shareholder i P is distributed a share i s secretly, 1 i n ≤ ≤ . Secret reconstruction algorithm In Shamir's (t, n)-secret sharing scheme, the reconstruction process can be described as follow:
x is the shareholder's ID, i y is the piece, s is the secret.
III. THE SCHEME
In an anonymous but accountable proxy multisignature scheme, the original signers use their standard signature algorithm to sign a warrant which includes the type of the information delegated, the original signer's identity, proxy signer' s pseudonym (which is correlated to proxy signer's real identity/public key) and the period of delegation, etc. As a result of the interaction between the proxy and original signers, the proxy signer generates a proxy private key. After that, the proxy signer can sign any messages according to the warrant. When necessary, (t or more) original signers can join together to reveal or demonstrate the real identity/public key of the proxy signer. The procedure can be seen as FIGURE 1.
A. Definition
In an anonymous but accountable proxy multisignature scheme, there are n original signers 1 Sign is a probabilistic polynomial-time signature issuing algorithm, which takes input message m, signer's private key sk , outputs a signature δ on message m. Veri is a deterministic verification algorithm. On input signer's public key, message m and a candidate signature δ for m, the algorithm outputs 1 if δ is a valid signature on m for the entity, and outputs 0 otherwise. PMSGen is a protocol used between the proxy signer and the original signers. The original signers and proxy signer take as input their private keys 1 Sig is valid for m by the proxy signer's pseudonym on behalf of the designated original signers, and outputs 0 otherwise. Reveal is used to reveal the real identity/public key of proxy signer when necessary.
Demonstration is used to demonstrate the real identity/public key of proxy signer when necessary.
B. Security Model
Adversaries can be classified into seven types: Type I This type of adversary only has the public keys of the original signers and proxy signer. He aims to forge a signature of a warrant w of the original signer or forge a proxy signature of a message m with respect to the original signer and the proxy signer. Type II This type of adversary has not only the public keys of the original signers and proxy signer but also the private key of proxy signer. He aims to forge a delegation signature of a warrant w that he chooses from the original signers. Note that once he can get the signature of a warrant w, he can forge any proxy signature on any message. Type III This type of adversary has not only the public keys of the original signer and proxy signer but also the private keys of some original signers. He aims to forge a valid proxy signature. From above we can find that if an AAPMS scheme is unforgeable against Type II and Type III adversaries, it is also unforgeable against Type I adversary. Type IV This type of adversary has only the public keys of the original signer. He aims to get the true identity of the proxy signer from the delegation file or the proxy signature. Type V This type of adversary aims to convince others that the proxy signer has made a proxy signature on behalf of the original signer(s) who has not delegated to the proxy signer. Type VI This type of adversary only has the public key of the original signers. He aims to malign an irrespective entity as the corresponding proxy signer. Type VIIThis type of adversary not only has the public key of the original signers but also the proxy signer. From above we can find that if an AAPMS scheme is unforgeable against Type VII adversary, it is also unforgeable against Type VI adversary. Definition 2. We define the AAPMS scheme's anonymous but accountable property as follows. can join together to provide the corresponding evidence to reveal who is the real proxy signer.
A proxy multi-signature scheme is said to has the property of anonymous but accountable if no one can found the real proxy signer before the t or more original signers provide evidence to reveal who is the real proxy signer.
C. Our Scheme
Our scheme is based on Cao and Cao's identitybased proxy multi-signature scheme [8] . Let 1 , , n O O K be the original signers and P be the proxy signer designated by 1 
ID , P has an identity P ID . Setup: Assume k is a security parameter. 1 G is a cyclic additive group of prime order q , with a generator P , 2 G is a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q , and (1) Delegation generation:
To delegate the signing capability to P , the original signers and the proxy signer do the following to make the signed warrant w. The warrant w specifies the necessary proxy details, such as the identity information of the original signers and the pseudonym of proxy signer, the type of the information delegated, and the period of delegation. The proxy signer selects n random number and sends them to the corresponding original signer in a secure channel.
Each original signer computes
as the proxy signer's pseudonym.
At last, the warrant used to AAPMS is 
IV. ANALYSIS OF OUR SCHEME
Theorem 1:
The above proxy multi-signature is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosenmessage attacks and adaptively chosen-warrant attacks in the random oracle model if the Computational DiffieHellman Problem in GDH groups is hard to solve. Proof. Our scheme is based on Cao and Cao's proxy multi-signature scheme [8] , which is provably secure in the random oracle model assuming the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in gap Diffie-Hellman groups. We just omit it. Theorem 2. Our scheme can stand against Type IV adversary. From the scheme above, we can find that our scheme reaches the target of anonymous but accountable. Proof. We suppose that the adversary would get the identity of the proxy signer from the proxy signature. Then he must has got pseum
impossible, because the adversary can not get O R from the original signer or the dealer. He cannot demonstrate it. Theorem 3. Our scheme can stand against TypeV adversary. Proof. We suppose that the adversary want to convince others that the proxy signer has made a proxy signature on behalf of the original signers  who have not delegated to the proxy signer. Because the scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model assuming the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in gap Diffie-Hellman groups, the adversary can not forge the corresponding warrant w, which has been proved in Cao and Cao's scheme. Theorem 4. Our scheme can stand against TypeVII adversary. Proof. We suppose the adversary want to malign Q  as  the proxy signer. In order to demonstrate Q  were the proxy signer, the adversary has to output a number O r , where O O R r P = . But it is impossible except he has solved the Discrete Logarithm Problem. Or the adversary has got more than t secret keys of original signers.
Because that if an AAPMS scheme is unforgeable against Type VII adversary, it is also unforgeable against Type VI adversary, so we just omit the proof.
We compared our scheme with Han et al and Du et al's scheme as bellow. 
V. CONCLUSION
Privacy has become one of the most important human rights of the modern age. Using the technology of pseudonym, in this paper, we propose a simple secure anonymous but accountable method for proxy signer in a proxy signature scheme. Unless the corresponding evidence has been provided by the original signer(s), no one can find the proxy signer's real identity or public key. In the scheme, the identity of the proxy signer was anonymous, but when t or more original signers want to reveal the proxy signer's identity, the proxy signer's identity would be revealed and be demonstrated.
APPENDIX A SECURITY PROOF
If there exists a type II adversary II A can breaks the standard signature scheme, then there exists an algorithm B which is able to use II A to solve an instance of the CDH problem with a non-negligible probability.. Short signature is proved to be secure against existential forgery on adaptive chosen-message attacks (in the random oracle model) assuming the CDHP (Computational DiffieHellman Problem) is hard, we just omit the proof.
If there exists a type III adversary III A can breaks the proxy multi-signature scheme, then there exists an algorithm B which is able to use III A to solve an instance of the CDH problem with a non-negligible probability. Proof. Algorithm C is given H -queries: At any time A can query the random oracle 4 H . To respond to queries to 4 H oracle, C maintains a list 4 L of tuples ( , , ) E occurs, and, in addition, 
and K Q plays the role of one of the original signers.) C recovers ( , , , ) 
